Dominic Bnonn Tennant

In this series, I forward a considered case for a universal atonement, presenting what I find to be the most compelling arguments for it, defining what exactly it entails, and interacting with the most common and persuasive objections against it.

This is part 6 of 6, in which I consider and confute the objection that a universal atonement would not actually secure or guarantee salvation for anyone.

In this series, I forward a considered case for a universal atonement, presenting what I find to be the most compelling arguments for it, defining what exactly it entails, and interacting with the most common and persuasive objections against it.

This is part 5 of 6, in which I refute the objection that universal atonement entails either universal salvation, or a double payment for sins.

In this series, I consider the competing doctrines of libertarian and compatibilist free will, arguing that the former is unbiblical and incoherent, and that the latter is necessary for upholding God’s sovereignty and man’s responsibility.

This is part 2 of 6, in which I compare determinism and indeterminism to clarify their differences.

In this series, I consider the competing doctrines of libertarian and compatibilist free will, arguing that the former is unbiblical and incoherent, and that the latter is necessary for upholding God’s sovereignty and man’s responsibility.

This is part 1 of 6, in which I present a simple argument showing that the Bible’s teaching about God’s action upon creation logically entails that nothing occurs without his actually causing it.

In this series, I consider the competing doctrines of libertarian and compatibilist free will, arguing that the former is unbiblical and incoherent, and that the latter is necessary for upholding God’s sovereignty and man’s responsibility.

This is the introduction to the series, in which I define the distinctives of libertarianism and compatibilism, and summarize the issues I’ll discuss.

In this series, I forward a considered case for a universal atonement, presenting what I find to be the most compelling arguments for it, defining what exactly it entails, and interacting with the most common and persuasive objections against it.

This is part 4 of 6, in which I interact with the objection that universal atonement requires that God be at cross-purposes with himself, entertaining frustrated desires which he cannot fulfill.

In this series, I forward a considered case for a universal atonement, presenting what I find to be the most compelling arguments for it, defining what exactly it entails, and interacting with the most common and persuasive objections against it.

This is part 3 of 6, in which I forward the argument that particular atonement provides no grounds for faith, and makes the assurance of salvation impossible.