Another thing I would like to put forward is the idea that the difference between decreeing and allowing is that in decreeing, the action (A) takes place BECAUSE of the decree, whereas in allowing, the action (A) takes place BECAUSE of the person’s choice. That is not mere semantics, but an essential part of assigning responsibility.

Well, actually in both instances there are at least two necessary conditions to A obtaining: God’s choice, and our choice. You’re making out as if, under a decretive view, the decree is a sufficient condition for A; while under a permissive view, the person’s choice is a sufficient condition for A. But that isn’t the case. As I said in the article, there is no meaningful distinction between the views. Under both, the action of God is a necessary condition for A, and the action of the person is a necessary condition for A.

However, His making of the world did not cause us to sin.

Where did I suggest that it did? How many times do I have to repeat that causation is not the issue here? What is at issue is determination. By creating this world, God determined that we would sin. I explicitly and repeatedly drew a distinction between determination and causation, so I’m not sure why you would even bring this up.

Firstly, you say that
“theistic determinism is true if… the outcome A or ¬A is actualized inevitably BECAUSE of a prior action on the part of God.”

Then you add that
“there is nothing about determination, per se, which requires a specific theory of CAUSATION with regard to what the “prior action of God” is. ”

Finally, after explaining your implausible theory of causality, you amend that
“It bears repeating that this is a unique kind of CAUSATION entirely unlike any other—a point sadly lost on Arminians, who appear to take a perverse delight in equivocating between it and other kinds of causation,”

I’d like to take a moment to quote Chesterton, when he responds to the idea that “all chairs are quite different” by saying “if all chairs are quite different, you could not call them all ‘chairs’!” One could not call a pen simply a different kind of chair, for instance, because it lacks the basic similarities and intrinsic qualities of a chair. If you want to use the term “because” or “causality” it must not be a type of “causality” completely unlike any other, because if it lacks the intrinsic qualities of causality, it is not a “different kind” of causality, but is not causality at all!

Another thing I would like to put forward is the idea that the difference between decreeing and allowing is that in decreeing, the action (A) takes place BECAUSE of the decree, whereas in allowing, the action (A) takes place BECAUSE of the person’s choice. That is not mere semantics, but an essential part of assigning responsibility.

Finally, God did initiate this world and no other, but that in and of itself does not prove that He decreed everything that was to happen. It is true that” if only” God did not make this world, we would not have sinned. However, His making of the world did not cause us to sin. Similarly, it is true that “if only” you had not written this blog, I would not have commented – however, your writing of the blog did not cause or determine that I would comment. I determined that I would comment. You equivocate creating the world and decreeing everything that would take place due to the “if only” fallacy. Without that fallacy [that "if only" God had created another universe, things would have happened differently, therefore God by creating this one caused everything to happen the way it did ] can you show logically that God decreed, determined, or otherwise caused every action of man?

1. Christian theism is true.
2. If Christian theism is true, then God is not the author of sin.
3.If Christian theism is true, then either Calvinism, Classical Arminianism, or Open Theism is true.
4. If Calvinism is true, the God is the author of sin.
5. If Classical Arminianism is true, then God is the author of sin.
6. Therefore, open theism is true.

This seems to make theistic determinism compatible with middle knowledge views.

Heh, I’d phrase it differently. I’d say that Molinism logically entails theistic determinism.

The difference seems to be whether one adopts a libertarian or compatibilist view of freedom and ones opinion as to which is consistent with God’s foreknowledge

It’s not entirely clear to me that the Molinist position is more libertarian than compatibilist. Aren’t Molinists committed to acknowledging that freedom does not entail the possibility of doing otherwise? Presumably they still think that this is compatible with indeterminism, but I’m at a loss as to how. Molinism seems to want to have its cake and eat it too. As I said, determinism per se doesn’t seem to commit you to any given theory of causation; but Molinism certainly does seem to commit you to determinism. But maybe I’ve missed something.

The problem is that compatiblism usually is defined in terms of some form of efficient material causation. Frankfurt counter examples for example involve some form of psychological population where by ones beliefs and desires cause the action. But once this seems to narrow the Calvinist position down to something stronger.

Well, I’ve admittedly done less reading than I’d like in this area, but I think that compatibilism is in a somewhat shoddy state in Reformed Christianity. As my friend Paul Manata likes to comment, compatibilists seem to have gotten stuck at Edwards. And while Edwards was very good in his day, things have moved on. Defining freedom purely in terms of strongest desire is problematic. Sometimes we seem to choose contrary to our strongest desire; so if we then say, “Well, what we chose actually was our strongest desire,” we seem to be ultimately saying very little at all. Our definition becomes very uninteresting. There is also the problem of holding insane or otherwise psychologically compromised people responsible for their actions. Under a classical compatibilist view, where freedom is merely acting on desire, there isn’t any clear reason for denying the moral responsibility of such people. That also seems problematic. So, while I’m a compatibilist in the sense that I affirm the consistency between theistic determination and human freedom, I’m not a Compatibilist with a capital C.

Second, it couldn’t it be argued that the “authorship of sin” issue depends on the kind of causation envisaged. Take a well known example, a person tells me he will kill himself if I don’t rape his wife. I refuse, he kills himself. In this situation I knew that my refusal to rape would result in him killing himself.

I’m not sure how you’d argue that with regard to any view which comes under my definition of theistic determinism. The kind of second-level causation in effect just doesn’t seem relevant given the ultimate action of God in instantiating this world. An analogy isn’t an argument; particularly since it is obviously not very analogous. You didn’t create a world in which there is a suicidal rape-voyeur fetishist. You didn’t create the fellow himself. You didn’t determine definitely and certainly that he would kill himself. You just happened to be there, and what he did was entirely his own doing, apart from any action of yours. But even under a weak actualization view, God instantiates this world, and no other. He determines from eternity what will happen, in every detail. So it doesn’t seem to me that you can merely dismiss the “author of sin” charge on grounds of a causal technicality. It’s the determinism itself which is at issue.

Regards,
Bnonn

A couple of points;
First, you define theistic determinism as

“TD: theistic determinism is true if, and only if, for an agent (S) choosing whether to act (A) at time t, the outcome A or ¬A is actualized inevitably because of a prior action on the part of God.”

And then state

“It seems to me that any definition which tries to impose a stronger element of determination becomes a caricature of the Reformed position. For instance, there is nothing about determination, per se, which requires a specific theory of causation with regard to what the “prior action of God” is.”

This seems to make theistic determinism compatible with middle knowledge views. Defenders of middle knowledge views for example would agree with TD, they simply utilise a concept of weak actualisation which does not involve efficient causation of a persons choices. But that seems allowed by your position. The difference seems to be whether one adopts a libertarian or compatibilist view of freedom and ones opinion as to which is consistent with God’s foreknowledge. Not the view of providence itself.

The problem is that compatiblism usually is defined in terms of some form of efficient material causation. Frankfurt counter examples for example involve some form of psychological population where by ones beliefs and desires cause the action. But once this seems to narrow the Calvinist position down to something stronger.

Second, it couldn’t it be argued that the “authorship of sin” issue depends on the kind of causation envisaged. Take a well known example, a person tells me he will kill himself if I don’t rape his wife. I refuse, he kills himself. In this situation I knew that my refusal to rape would result in him killing himself. On the other hand if I manipulated his desires so as to ensure he killed himself I would be. Hence, what one adds over and above existential freedom seems to be important.

What I objected to was accepting a number of arguments that are used and developed by open theists like William Hasker against conservative versions of Arminianism without so much as a pass at criticizing the view that Hasker uses them to defend.

Well, you’re entitled to your objection—but since open theism wasn’t under discussion, the history of the arguments just seemed irrelevant. If we felt obliged to tip our hats every time we used an argument or idea, and offer a brief commentary on their origins and other uses, we’d never say anything.

And just saying “well, open theists aren’t real Christians” is something that is going to persuade only people committed in advance to a tendentious view of who real Christians are.

Again, open theism isn’t under discussion, so I feel no obligation to offer more than a passing remark about its status as a Christian theology. I’ve defended my view on it in the past—as a search of my blog will demonstrate. It’s also ironically tendentious of you to claim that my view of who Christians are is tendentious.

I don’t know of anybody besides yourself who has straightforwardly denied that I am a Christian.

I don’t recall straightforwardly denying that you’re a Christian. I’ve certainly straightforwardly stated that I really doubt it. Given everything you’ve said and argued, I’d describe you frankly as a humanist with Christian pretentious. That said, I don’t know the heart. All I can say is that your expressed views make a mockery of your expressed faith—thus it’s extremely hard to take your profession seriously.

Steve Hays has said some pretty harsh things about me, but has not said point blank that I am not a Christian. Neither has Paul Manata.

Perhaps they are better men than I.

And certainly the Arminians who post at my site don’t raise the questions about my profession of faith.

Well, maybe you haven’t noticed, Victor, but the Arminians who post on your site are not exactly top quality scholars. They are basically trolls who use your blog as a launchpad for their anti-Calvinist rants. They’re using you. They don’t care about your status as a Christian. They just care about ragging on their pet hate: the doctrines of grace. Your blog lends them a convenient aura of respectability, and is unmoderated.

I sometimes wonder if you think an Arminian can be saved.

I sometimes wonder the same thing. The more I interact with Arminians, the more my doubts grow. But with God, anything is possible.

Would you agree with this guy on Lewis? Because that is where your position leads. http://www.trinityfoundation.org/journal.php?id=103

John Robbins was a bit of a nutjob. I wouldn’t say I agree with him. I’d say that I can see where he’s coming from.

Simply saying that someone isn’t Christian is not a substitute for refuting their position. Why is open theism false?

Since that’s totally off topic, and since I’ve covered it here before, I’d invite you to let your fingers do the walking.