Dominic Bnonn Tennant

⇐ Continued from ‘On free will: introduction’

Before I critique the libertarian view, and get into the nitty-gritty of moral responsibility and whatnot, I’m going to present what seems to me a very simple, very air-tight argument for divine determinism. This argument ought to be persuasive to anyone committed to the inerrancy of Scripture, and possibly even to someone who isn’t since its premises are philosophically supported as well. I recently dusted it off during a debate on the relationship between human and divine actions in the comment thread of Paul Manata’s article, ‘Bad Intentions’.1 Since my presentation of it on Triablogue was somewhat simplistic, I’ve taken some suggestions under advisement and spruced it up here so as to be more rigorous. I’ll present the argument itself in section (I); then in section (II) I’ll dissect it to prove that it’s sound.

I. The argument proposed

I take it as given that any Christian knows that all things which exist are made to exist both initially and continually by God only. See John 1:3; Colossians 1:16; Revelation 4:11; Genesis 1:1; Ecclesiastes 11:5; Hebrews 1:3; Colossians 1:17; and Acts 17:28. Now, “all things which exist” are adequately described as anything, at any time, which actually obtains in reality—or, more simply, anytime anything is real. And the phrase “makes to exist initially and continually” refers simply to the instantiation of something in reality, for as long as it is in reality. If God makes something to exist, both initially and continually, then God instantiates it in reality. I therefore propose the following:

1. Anytime anything is real (R), God alone instantiates it in reality (G).
2. A human choice (C) is real.
3. Therefore, God alone instantiates a human choice in reality [by modus ponens].2

II. The argument defended

I should state from the outset that this argument obviously excludes God himself. As Paul puts it in another context, “But when it says, ‘all things are put in subjection,’ it is plain that he is excepted who put all things in subjection under him” (1 Corinthians 15:27).

Premise 1: Anytime anything is real, God alone instantiates it in reality

This is simply a restatement, into more useful language, of the fact that God causes all things to exist both initially and continually. That fact in turn is derived immediately from the verses cited. I invite you to examine these to see that they really do say what I claim they say; a full exegesis of each one would take too long to consider here. Certainly Arminianism—which is probably the most popular option in terms of libertarian Christianity—affirms that all things which exist are made to exist initially and continually by God only.3 Thus, I take it as an uncontroversial Christian existential statement.

It is also a plainly true one under Christian presuppositions, given that it constitutes merely the observation that all things exist either necessarily or contingently. If a thing exists contingently, that just means in turn that it exists only so long as its existence is being caused by something else—because, by definition, a thing which exists without being caused exists necessarily. Thus, for any contingent thing, if the cause of its existence is arrested, then its existence is arrested. Given that God is the only thing which exists necessarily, it then must be the case that all other things exist only as long as he causes them to do so.

Another way of saying this is that nothing except God exists from within itself. Existence as inherent is something unique to God—that is why he is the ground of all reality. All other instances of existence are secondary to God, being imposed by him. They aren’t from within whatever thing it is which exists, but from without. Inherent existence, or self-existence, is by definition non-communicable—it cannot be given to anything, because if a thing had it then it would already exist. Thus, for anything which has existence imposed on it (namely anything created), its existence must be continually imposed on it; and for anything which does not have its existence imposed on it (namely God), it exists necessarily and could not fail to exist.

Yet another way of thinking about this is to realize that creation, and everything within it, is an effect of God’s creative power. Since no effect can be free from its cause, it stands to reason that as long as creation exists, God must be causing it to exist.

I labor this point not because I think a Christian wouldn’t agree with it, but because I expect that he would—provided he understands it. Since it’s probably not consciously believed by many Christians, it warrants at least a clear explanation for those readers who haven’t considered it before, so that they can see that it’s really an uncontroversial Christian doctrine.

Lastly, it will be noted by the careful reader that only divine action is described in this premise. Human action is not precluded; it simply isn’t in view. It’s certainly possible that anytime anything is real, something other than God instantiates it in reality in a different sense than God does. But, in terms of divine causation, God is all there is. Any Christian must agree with that. And of course, in terms of natural causality (such as when we cause things) God is not in view, since he is not a part of nature.

Premise 2: a human choice is real

What this means is that human choices actually exist; they obtain in reality. It’s hard to imagine anyone seriously denying this premise, since to do so would entail making a real, existent choice. I take it as entirely self-evident that human choices do exist—whatever their precise nature and mechanism may be.

Conclusion: God alone instantiates a human choice in reality

The conclusion follows inevitably. Since anything which obtains in reality obtains by virtue of God’s causing it to be so, and human choices obtain in reality, then it is inescapable that any and all human choices obtain by virtue of God’s causing them. Again, I’d remind you that this does not exclude natural causes such as our own wills. Obviously our choices obtain because we cause them as well. But what is in view here is divine causation, and in that regard the conclusion cannot be avoided that God alone does indeed instantiate our choices in reality.

One potential objection might be that I’m assuming too much from this conclusion. It’s true that God instantiates our choices, but by this we can only say that he “honors” those choices by letting them actually take effect. He doesn’t “make them for us” or any such thing. But this objection obviously fails because it conflates choices with the actions which proceed from them. What I’m talking about here are the actual mental decisions we make in any given situation—not what we then subsequently do in virtue of those decisions. Everything which is real is made real by God. Everything is brought into reality by the prior planning, determination, and counsel of his will.

By this it can be said that God not only causes the choices we make, but that he is in perfect control of how these choices come about, having exhaustively planned them, before consequently instantiating them. This is the inevitable and true conclusion of the argument—unpalatable as it may be to our fallen egos.

Continued in ‘On free will, part 2: a comparison of determinism with indeterminism’ ⇒

1. ↑ Paul Manata, ‘Bad Intentions’ (http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2009/01/bad-intentions.html).
2. ↑ In notational form, the argument is as follows:
   1. R → G
   2. ( C → ) R
   3. ( C → ) G [mp]

   Or, if I’ve got my first order logic right:

   1. ∀x G(x)
   2. ∃x. C(x)
   3. ∴ C(x) → G(x)
3. ↑ See Jacob Arminius, ‘Public Disputations’, Works, 2:183.