Dominic Bnonn Tennant

On the distinction between saving and non-saving faith

A clarification of my previous comments regarding the difference between the belief of a saved Christian, and the belief of an unsaved reprobate.

The purpose of regeneration revisited

Was I mistaken about the purpose of regeneration? A response to Ben at Arminian Perspectives, defending my position and refuting his objections.

What purpose does regeneration serve?

What is the purpose of regeneration, if God can direct the will of man in any direction he chooses? Why must God regenerate a sinner to create faith in him—could he not just control his will so that he believes? A question from Ben at Arminian Perspectives, answered.

On free will, part 2: a comparison of determinism with indeterminism

In this series, I consider the competing doctrines of libertarian and compatibilist free will, arguing that the former is unbiblical and incoherent, and that the latter is necessary for upholding God’s sovereignty and man’s responsibility.

This is part 2 of 6, in which I compare determinism and indeterminism to clarify their differences.

On free will, part 1: a simple argument for divine determinism

In this series, I consider the competing doctrines of libertarian and compatibilist free will, arguing that the former is unbiblical and incoherent, and that the latter is necessary for upholding God’s sovereignty and man’s responsibility.

This is part 1 of 6, in which I present a simple argument showing that the Bible’s teaching about God’s action upon creation logically entails that nothing occurs without his actually causing it.

On free will: introduction

In this series, I consider the competing doctrines of libertarian and compatibilist free will, arguing that the former is unbiblical and incoherent, and that the latter is necessary for upholding God’s sovereignty and man’s responsibility.

This is the introduction to the series, in which I define the distinctives of libertarianism and compatibilism, and summarize the issues I’ll discuss.

On the atonement, part 4: God’s desires frustrated?

In this series, I forward a considered case for a universal atonement, presenting what I find to be the most compelling arguments for it, defining what exactly it entails, and interacting with the most common and persuasive objections against it.

This is part 4 of 6, in which I interact with the objection that universal atonement requires that God be at cross-purposes with himself, entertaining frustrated desires which he cannot fulfill.