As most any Calvinist probably knows, one of the primary objections to Reformed theology from Arminians is that it entails a deterministic relationship between creation and God. That is to say, God meticulously determines everything which transpires in creation, such that man cannot have free will in the libertarian sense (Calvinists argue that he can still have free will, however, in the compatibilist sense). Arminians allege that determinism makes God the “author of sin”—an ill-defined, emotionally-laden term which generally conveys that God, in some sense, is the ultimate origin of evil. Under Arminian lights, this cannot be and amounts to blasphemy against God’s holy character.

Determinism defined

In the comment thread of Steve Hays’ brief article, ‘What is Determinism?’, I posit the following definition of theistic or theological determinism (as opposed to the secular notion of physical determinism):

TD: theistic determinism is true if, and only if, for an agent (S) choosing whether to act (A) at time t, the outcome A or ¬A is actualized inevitably because of a prior action on the part of God.

It seems to me that any definition which tries to impose a stronger element of determination becomes a caricature of the Reformed position. For instance, there is nothing about determination, per se, which requires a specific theory of causation with regard to what the “prior action of God” is. However, this being the case, how does Arminianism differ, functionally, from Calvinism itself? To elaborate—

God’s action under Calvinism

By Reformed lights, the “prior action of God” enjoys the following general sequence: God (1) surveys all the possible worlds he could create, and then chooses to create this one (call it W1)—evil and all. This is his decretive or “planning” action. Then, from eternity, God (2) creates this world by speaking it into being. This is his initial instantiative or “creative” action. Then, again from eternity, God (3) upholds this world moment to moment, thus keeping it in existence by employing his unique power of existential causation (that is, his power of making things exist; as opposed to natural causation like one billiard ball moving another). This is his continual instantiative or “conservational” action.

Because this last action applies meticulously to everything which exists, it stands to reason that there’s a sense in which God causes all things—including evil. It bears repeating that this is a unique kind of causation entirely unlike any other—a point sadly lost on Arminians, who appear to take a perverse delight in equivocating between it and other kinds of causation, such that they take God to himself be evil, to be thinking our thoughts for us, to be pulling the strings of puppets, and so on.

God’s action under Arminianism

However, consider the Arminian alternative. The “prior action of God” is not so different. First, God (1) surveys all the possible worlds he could create, and then chooses to create this one—evil and all. Arminians prefer to avoid the term “decree”, especially when we are specifically focusing on God’s surveying the evil in this world. Instead, they use the term “permit”. But the only distinction appears to be one of semantics. Given that Arminians and Calvinists agree that God has perfect, definite foreknowledge, and that he knew precisely every event which would occur in this world when he chose to create it, whether we characterize God as “permitting” evil by creating this particular world, or as “decreeing” evil by creating this particular world, is neither here nor there.

God then, from eternity, (2) creates this world by speaking it into being. At this point, the entire course of history, down to the nth degree of detail, is meticulously and unchangeably known by God. Every sin ever committed is perfectly foreseen. This being the case, every moment of creation occurs inevitably as God foreknew it would when he set things in motion by creating the world. Every sin occurs inevitably. Every human choice must go the way God has foreseen; it cannot go any other way, since God cannot be wrong. So the principle of alternate possibility, which is frequently taken by Arminians as requisite to libertarian freedom, is plainly false.

Lastly, God, from eternity, (3) upholds creation by the word of his power. Arminians dispute the Calvinistic view that God must meticulously cause each moment of creation (remembering, of course, that this is a sui generis, existential causation). But they agree that he must at least be permitting each moment to occur, for even they will not go so far as to say that things can occur without God’s ‘passive’ involvement.

What’s the difference?

The two views both require at least the following prior action on God’s part before any event in creation can occur—human choices included:

3. decretive plan → creation → active conservation
1. permissive plan → creation → passive conservation

And, following this prior action, any given event must take place inevitably. In Calvinism, God’s decree and active causation of W1 (this-world-and-no-other) make any human choice inevitable. And in Arminianism, God’s permission and initial instantiation of W1 also render the outcome of any human choice inevitable. Thus, in terms of theistic determinism, the only functional difference between Calvinism and Arminianism is that Calvinism openly admits its commitment to determinism, while Arminianism openly denies it while inconsistently being committed to it anyway.

Conclusion: if determinism makes God the “author of sin”, then both Calvinism and Arminianism make God the author sin. Arminians may now kindly refrain from leveling this objection against Calvinists any more.

The answer to your question isn’t so difficult if you consider what faith is. Faith is not merely an abstract awareness of some or other facts about God and Christ. It is an intimate knowledge about these things, communicated directly by the Spirit. That is Paul’s main point in 1 Corinthians 2, where he ends with that remarkable statement, “But we have the mind of Christ” (v 16b). What does that mean? Why is it that we have—that we need—the mind of Christ? Because “who knows a person’s thoughts except the spirit of that person, which is in him?” (v 11) And what is it that we know? “A secret and hidden wisdom of God” (v 7) which “no eye has seen, nor ear heard, nor the heart of man imagined” (v 9). If the heart of man has not imagined these things, then how can we know about them? Because “these things God has revealed to us through the Spirit” (v 10). We have knowledge of them precisely because we have “the Spirit who is from God, that we might understand the things freely given us by God.”

This is the mind of Christ; and this is why the natural person, the person who has not received the Spirit of God, “does not accept the things of the Spirit of God”—why they are “folly” to him, and why “he is not able to understand them”: because “they are spiritually discerned” (v 14). If one does not have the Spirit, one cannot understand the things of God, because these things require direct communication by the Spirit to the believer. They are things of God’s own mind, which (whether by his decree or by their very nature) cannot be grasped by anyone not availed of that mind. Thus we must be indwelled by the Spirit, having “the mind of Christ”, in order to understand the spiritual truths which comprise Christianity. Without the mind of Christ, according to Paul, faith is impossible.

Now, certainly God may incline a spiritually dead person to believe certain Christian propositions for a time—but since faith entails a knowledge which can only be communicated by the indwelling Spirit, and can only be understood by someone with that Spirit, it remains that if a person believes Christian propositions like “Christ died for the sins of the world”, yet does not have the Spirit of Christ, then he does not have faith. Since faith, by definition, requires the indwelling of the Spirit, not even God can direct a man to faith without first giving him that Spirit. He can incline an unregenerate heart to believe the propositions which are also believed in faith, certainly—but that belief does not constitute faith. It’s merely an imitation of faith, having no real substance; no real apprehension. It cannot be any more than what that unregenerate heart can muster from its own depths—and there is nothing good, nothing like the intimate knowledge of God required for salvation, down there.

It really goes without saying that this renders Arminianism untenable. In your previous post, ‘The Arminian and Calvinist Ordo Salutis: A Brief Comparative Study’, you listed prevenient grace as the only item prior to faith. In your view, prevenient grace is required for totally depraved man to be able to libertarianly choose to have faith—but only prevenient grace. Then, following logically on from that faith, you would say that the person is then joined with Christ, justified, and only then regenerated. But according to 1 Corinthians 2, prevenient grace would have to entail nothing less than the full indwelling of the Spirit of God in order to make faith possible. Nothing less than that suffices to convince the “natural man” of spiritual truths. Nothing less than the mind of Christ is needed for a person to understand Christianity so as to have faith at all. As John puts it, a man must be reborn of the Spirit before he can “see” the kingdom of God (John 3:3,8).

But this being the case, it is evident that once a man has the mind of Christ, he will be convinced of and understand the truths of Christianity (not in a flash, of course; not all at once—but inevitably). Once a man is reborn of the Spirit, he will see the kingdom of God. So if the Arminian wishes to go so far as to say that prevenient grace does indeed entail the indwelling of the Spirit in some sense, then he goes too far because either prevenient grace is not given to everyone (in which case, it’s hard to see the distinction between Arminianism and Calvinism here); or everyone is a Christian and is saved (which is plainly false on both scriptural and merely empirical grounds). Furthermore, the question remains: what, in your ordo salutus, is regeneration, if prevenient grace is a sufficient condition of saving faith?

The only theological system which accommodates Paul’s teachings regarding the nature and requirements of spiritual belief is Calvinism. Those teachings are accurately reflected in the monogerstic view which Calvinism takes of regeneration, wherein God must sovereingly work by giving his Spirit to those whom he has elected to salvation. He knows who will believe because he knows to whom he will give his Spirit. By contrast, the Arminian scheme renders 1 Corinthians 2 incoherent, since God’s knowledge of whom he will save is based on those people’s own choosing—yet they cannot choose without God first having given them his Spirit.

Continued in ‘The purpose of regeneration revisited’ ⇒

Related posts:

1. Determinism and the authorship of sin in Calvinism and Arminianism

Before evaluating how free will relates to moral responsibility—which is really the crux of the debate as I see it—there are some prior matters which need to be understood. Particularly, the distinction between the two basic views regarding freedom, and the reasons for these distinctions, should be briefly considered.

The freedom relationship

Although it commonly goes unsaid in the context of this issue, freedom is always a relationship. Thus, when we talk about free will, we must be meaning one or both of the following:

1. In our ability to properly choose, we enjoy a freedom to something;
2. in our ability to properly choose,1 we enjoy a freedom from something.

Both the compatibilist and the libertarian agree that both options are true. The libertarian maintains that we have a freedom to choose between two or more actually possible alternatives; ie, that this freedom is from necessity. In other words, for any given choice, we really could choose either alternative a or alternative b. Or, viewed from the other direction, the alternative we choose is not determined inevitably by any prior factors, such that although we seem able to choose b, we can only actually choose a because that’s what’s been predetermined. The freedom to is merely a restatement of the freedom from, and vice versa.

If our choices were inevitably determined, according to the libertarian, then they would not be “ours”. This is because they would actually be just the outcome of these prior factors, rather than a result our own acts of volition. Hence, the libertarian view is called indeterminism. It maintains that a fully determined choice is not a “proper” or “real” choice—all human choices, to be proper human choices, must be free from prior determination. And if a choice is not determined by prior factors, then it is necessarily indeterminate until the moment it is made. In this regard, libertarians consider God’s determinative action to be incompatible with proper human choices, and so they are also called incompatibilists.

Determinists or compatibilists, on the other hand, take the view that a choice may indeed be fully determined by prior factors, and yet be free. This is because they hold that a choice, to be a proper choice, must only be free from coercion—not necessarily free from determination. They agree with libertarians that a choice must be “ours”. They disagree that a choice is not “ours” if it has been determined by prior factors. In fact, a choice is always determined by at least the prior factor of the greatest desire we entertain at the time. This is what, speaking in terms of the causes and effects within our own minds, determines which option out of many we will select.

Thus, compatibilists argue that free will entails merely freedom to choose between apparently possible alternatives; and merely freedom from being forced to pursue one alternative or another—as opposed to being determined to do so. However, because our choices are determined by God prior to our actually making them, we don’t choose between actually possible alternatives. If we choose alternative b, then we always were going to choose b, even though until the moment of choosing we felt like we could have selected a. Our choice was inevitable, on the basis of God’s prior determination. But it was not forced—it was, in fact, still a product of our faculty of will, functioning apart from any coercion. We weren’t made to choose against our will—rather, we chose freely precisely because we chose what we wanted most at that time, and what we wanted most, like all things in creation, was determined in advance by God.

The origins of choices

This highlights the issue which divides libertarians and compatibilists. The libertarian is primarily concerned with showing that our choices are properly ours. The reason he is worried about prior determination is because he rightly wants to uphold the responsibility of man. If a choice has its origin outside a man’s will, then that choice is not ultimately a product of his will, and so it’s hard to see how it can be thought of as being properly his. And if it is not properly his, then how can he be held responsible for it, whether for punishment or reward?

The complicating factor, from the Reformed perspective, is that although this issue is cast in terms of responsibility, it ultimately is a question of sovereignty. The libertarian rightly wishes to uphold man’s responsibility, but in doing so he is making an appeal to man’s sovereignty. If a choice does not find its ultimate origin in man himself, the libertarian says, then the man cannot be held responsible for it. The Calvinist is compelled to disagree. Whether the libertarian means to or not, he is exalting man into the position of God himself by supposing that man can be the ultimate origin of anything. In our fallen state, this is a very natural thing for us to do—which is why, I’d argue, libertarianism is as popular as it is. But for this very reason libertarians ought to be especially careful, when evaluating the issues in this debate, to examine themselves soberly, ensuring that they aren’t holding their position for the wrong reasons.

Contra the libertarian, the compatibilist argues that the pertinent issue is not whether a man’s choice has its ultimate origin in his faculty of will. Rather, it’s whether a man’s choice has its immediate origin there. Naturally, the choice must be made by the man in order for it to be his, and for him to be held responsible for it. If it is made by him, then it has its origin in his faculty of will. That needs to be the immediate cause of the choice; otherwise it is not directly his. But the compatibilist recognizes that causes themselves have causes, and that determinations are themselves determined. Importantly, he finds the conclusion of the argument I gave in part 1 convincing: God is the ultimate cause of all things. This being the case, it is unavoidable that our choices are predetermined, since if God did not determine them they would never obtain. If the libertarian believes that this obviates them as proper choices, so much the worse for that belief. It’s impossible that our choices couldn’t have their ultimate origin in God, and since God holds us responsible for them nonetheless, it is only logical to conclude that the libertarian must be wrong.

Now, I haven’t yet found anyone who could fault the argument in part 1. That’s why I’ve started this series with it. Anyone is welcome to critique it, and I’d be happy to interact with that critique. But I don’t anticipate a refutation, because it’s just a basic stipulation of a consistent application of the Christian view of reality. The remaining parts of this series will all follow on from that argument by showing how libertarianism is inconsistent in some way—either with other propositions it’s supposed to protect, or with itself, or with other basic Christian doctrines. It enjoys strong, face-value intuitive support. But, as I will argue, it enjoys absolutely no strong, in-depth intellectual support.

1. ↑ When I speak of “choice” or “choosing”, I take it as fairly obvious what I mean. However, to avoid any confusion, allow me to quote libertarian Robert Kane’s very adequate definition: “A choice is the formation of an intention or purpose to do something” (Robert Kane, ‘Libertarianism’ in John Martin Fischer et al, Four Views On Free Will (Blackwell 2007), 33.

Continued in ‘On free will, part 3: the grounds for moral responsibility’ ⇒

Related posts:

1. Determinism and the authorship of sin in Calvinism and Arminianism

Before I critique the libertarian view, and get into the nitty-gritty of moral responsibility and whatnot, I’m going to present what seems to me a very simple, very air-tight argument for divine determinism. This argument ought to be persuasive to anyone committed to the inerrancy of Scripture, and possibly even to someone who isn’t since its premises are philosophically supported as well. I recently dusted it off during a debate on the relationship between human and divine actions in the comment thread of Paul Manata’s article, ‘Bad Intentions’.1 Since my presentation of it on Triablogue was somewhat simplistic, I’ve taken some suggestions under advisement and spruced it up here so as to be more rigorous. I’ll present the argument itself in section (I); then in section (II) I’ll dissect it to prove that it’s sound.

I. The argument proposed

I take it as given that any Christian knows that all things which exist are made to exist both initially and continually by God only. See John 1:3; Colossians 1:16; Revelation 4:11; Genesis 1:1; Ecclesiastes 11:5; Hebrews 1:3; Colossians 1:17; and Acts 17:28. Now, “all things which exist” are adequately described as anything, at any time, which actually obtains in reality—or, more simply, anytime anything is real. And the phrase “makes to exist initially and continually” refers simply to the instantiation of something in reality, for as long as it is in reality. If God makes something to exist, both initially and continually, then God instantiates it in reality. I therefore propose the following:

1. Anytime anything is real (R), God alone instantiates it in reality (G).
2. A human choice (C) is real.
3. Therefore, God alone instantiates a human choice in reality [by modus ponens].2

II. The argument defended

I should state from the outset that this argument obviously excludes God himself. As Paul puts it in another context, “But when it says, ‘all things are put in subjection,’ it is plain that he is excepted who put all things in subjection under him” (1 Corinthians 15:27).

Premise 1: Anytime anything is real, God alone instantiates it in reality

This is simply a restatement, into more useful language, of the fact that God causes all things to exist both initially and continually. That fact in turn is derived immediately from the verses cited. I invite you to examine these to see that they really do say what I claim they say; a full exegesis of each one would take too long to consider here. Certainly Arminianism—which is probably the most popular option in terms of libertarian Christianity—affirms that all things which exist are made to exist initially and continually by God only.3 Thus, I take it as an uncontroversial Christian existential statement.

It is also a plainly true one under Christian presuppositions, given that it constitutes merely the observation that all things exist either necessarily or contingently. If a thing exists contingently, that just means in turn that it exists only so long as its existence is being caused by something else—because, by definition, a thing which exists without being caused exists necessarily. Thus, for any contingent thing, if the cause of its existence is arrested, then its existence is arrested. Given that God is the only thing which exists necessarily, it then must be the case that all other things exist only as long as he causes them to do so.

Another way of saying this is that nothing except God exists from within itself. Existence as inherent is something unique to God—that is why he is the ground of all reality. All other instances of existence are secondary to God, being imposed by him. They aren’t from within whatever thing it is which exists, but from without. Inherent existence, or self-existence, is by definition non-communicable—it cannot be given to anything, because if a thing had it then it would already exist. Thus, for anything which has existence imposed on it (namely anything created), its existence must be continually imposed on it; and for anything which does not have its existence imposed on it (namely God), it exists necessarily and could not fail to exist.

Yet another way of thinking about this is to realize that creation, and everything within it, is an effect of God’s creative power. Since no effect can be free from its cause, it stands to reason that as long as creation exists, God must be causing it to exist.

I labor this point not because I think a Christian wouldn’t agree with it, but because I expect that he would—provided he understands it. Since it’s probably not consciously believed by many Christians, it warrants at least a clear explanation for those readers who haven’t considered it before, so that they can see that it’s really an uncontroversial Christian doctrine.

Lastly, it will be noted by the careful reader that only divine action is described in this premise. Human action is not precluded; it simply isn’t in view. It’s certainly possible that anytime anything is real, something other than God instantiates it in reality in a different sense than God does. But, in terms of divine causation, God is all there is. Any Christian must agree with that. And of course, in terms of natural causality (such as when we cause things) God is not in view, since he is not a part of nature.

Premise 2: a human choice is real

What this means is that human choices actually exist; they obtain in reality. It’s hard to imagine anyone seriously denying this premise, since to do so would entail making a real, existent choice. I take it as entirely self-evident that human choices do exist—whatever their precise nature and mechanism may be.

Conclusion: God alone instantiates a human choice in reality

The conclusion follows inevitably. Since anything which obtains in reality obtains by virtue of God’s causing it to be so, and human choices obtain in reality, then it is inescapable that any and all human choices obtain by virtue of God’s causing them. Again, I’d remind you that this does not exclude natural causes such as our own wills. Obviously our choices obtain because we cause them as well. But what is in view here is divine causation, and in that regard the conclusion cannot be avoided that God alone does indeed instantiate our choices in reality.

One potential objection might be that I’m assuming too much from this conclusion. It’s true that God instantiates our choices, but by this we can only say that he “honors” those choices by letting them actually take effect. He doesn’t “make them for us” or any such thing. But this objection obviously fails because it conflates choices with the actions which proceed from them. What I’m talking about here are the actual mental decisions we make in any given situation—not what we then subsequently do in virtue of those decisions. Everything which is real is made real by God. Everything is brought into reality by the prior planning, determination, and counsel of his will.

By this it can be said that God not only causes the choices we make, but that he is in perfect control of how these choices come about, having exhaustively planned them, before consequently instantiating them. This is the inevitable and true conclusion of the argument—unpalatable as it may be to our fallen egos.

Continued in ‘On free will, part 2: a comparison of determinism with indeterminism’ ⇒

1. ↑ Paul Manata, ‘Bad Intentions’ (http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2009/01/bad-intentions.html).
2. ↑ In notational form, the argument is as follows:
   1. R → G
   2. ( C → ) R
   3. ( C → ) G [mp]

   Or, if I’ve got my first order logic right:

   1. ∀x G(x)
   2. ∃x. C(x)
   3. ∴ C(x) → G(x)
3. ↑ See Jacob Arminius, ‘Public Disputations’, Works, 2:183.

Related posts:

1. Determinism and the authorship of sin in Calvinism and Arminianism

I. The nature and extent of the atonement

But the greatest objection to Arminianism is a logical one. If, as Arminians say, Jesus died for the sin of everyone, then surely one of those sins was unbelief [...] If Jesus did pay the price for every sin of every man, including unbelief, why does God still choose to punish those who do not accept him by excluding them from his presence for eternity? [...] The logical flow of Arminianism then, seems to be towards Universalism.

A robust response to this, albeit one I’d make from a Reformed rather than an Arminian perspective, would be either (i) that Jesus’ atonement was not pecuniary, so it was not like a financial transaction with a 1-1 correspondence of sins committed to sins atoned for; or (ii) that it was only representatively pecuniary, so that although it was like a financial transaction, it was a representative transaction which can be applied to anyone without an actual 1-1 correspondence of sins. I myself hold to one of these positions (I’m still working out which one). My basic reasoning is as follows:

If the atonement was fully pecuniary, then a universal atonement would either entail universal salvation, or a double payment for sin (Jesus paid for the sins of those who go to hell, and they themselves pay for those sins). Universal salvation is flagrantly heretical and mitigates the whole point of the gospel, and double payment is fragrantly unjust and historically has been rejected because “shall not the judge of all the earth do what is right?” So I conclude either that the atonement was made specifically for the elect alone, or it was not pecuniary; and I think the biblical data favors a universal intent in the atonement, even though the elect are specifically in view. That is, I hold to the historical Reformed view that the atonement was sufficient for all, but efficient only for the elect. I think this is the more reasonable view, as opposed to a totally limited atonement, because:

If the atonement was not even sufficient for everyone, then God’s contingent intention that everyone should be saved is not reflected in the sacrifice he made in Jesus. That is, God the Father desires all people to be saved, but particularly the elect (because his desire for all is contingent on his larger desire to glorify his wrath and justice through the reprobation of some); God the Holy Spirit convicts all people of sin, but particularly calls the elect; therefore, it is incongruent that God the Son would not die for all, though particularly for the elect.

Further, if the atonement was not sufficient for all, then the grounds for preaching the gospel to everyone without exception, either as a command or as an invitation, are removed. That is, the gospel call has no ontological referent for the non-elect. It is inviting and commanding them to believe in something which does not exist for them. This makes God both insincere (in regards to the invitation) and unjust (in regards to holding the non-elect responsible for their rejection of the gospel as a command).

Lastly, this being the case, a totally limited atonement would also remove the objective grounds for Christian faith (epistemically speaking; not ontologically). That is, if the atonement was sufficient only to save the elect, I would need assurance that I am elect in order to appropriate the promise of salvation. Obviously, any such assurance will be subjective and fickle, and so I will have no sure grounds believing that the atonement was sufficient to save me. However, if it was sufficient for all, then I have objective grounds for laying hold of the promise, because I know that it is sufficient to save everyone without exception.

The atonement is one of the most difficult and complicated doctrines in Christianity, and I think it’s badly neglected by most Christians. A careful dissection of the logic behind it really takes apart a lot of popular but ill-conceived Christian positions. But it bears a lot of thinking about—my own thinking is still jejune, and I expect I will develop these ideas much further—and possibly change them—as I spend more time in study. In that vein, I’ll soon be posting a fairly lengthy series examining limited atonement in some detail.

II. Total depravity and the nature of faith

But does that depravity extend to not being able to simply say “Yes, thank you”, to God. I know you will say it does; and this is the point I’m struggling with. I’m not sure that it does. I’m open to being convinced though (so bring on the John Piper), because I’m not convinced that prevenient grace is a satisfactory answer [...] That’s why I realate God’ election closely to his foreknowledge. If he knows who will say “yes”, perhaps that is why they are the Elect?

Let me offer one passage which I think speaks to this question in a way which is fairly clear—John 6:44: “No one can come to me unless the Father who sent me draws him. And I will raise him up on the last day.” For a detailed examination of this passage, I recommend Brian Bosse, ‘A Logical Analysis – John 6:44′ (PDF); but notice briefly that:

1. No one can come to Christ unless the Father draws that person.
2. The person drawn by the Father will be raised up by Christ on the last day.

From this we can infer:

3. Everyone drawn by the Father will come to Christ and be raised up on the last day.

Let’s formulate an argument based on this to test the idea that God elects people based on foreseen faith in response to prevenient grace:

3. Everyone drawn by the Father will come to Christ and be raised up on the last day.
4. Prevenient grace is the means by which the Father draws people to Christ, ex hypothesi.
5. Prevenient grace, by definition, is extended to everyone without exception.
6. Therefore, everyone without exception is drawn to Christ and raised up on the last day.
7. But this is universalism, which is false.
8. Therefore, prevenient grace is not the means by which the Father draws people to Christ.

Now, in response to this you could argue that God foresees who will accept prevenient grace and who will not, and then only extends it to those who will. But then I would ask:

a. Where in Scripture is this taught? It seems highly speculative, and an unnecessary convolution around the simpler doctrine that God elects based on his own will rather than ours (see for example John 1:13 or James 1:18 or 1 Peter 1:3—notice who is active in all these; and compare with John 6:63).

Moreover, is it not evident in 1 Corinthians 2 that the very reason we believe in Christ is because we have the Spirit of God? “For who knows a person’s thoughts except the spirit of that person, which is in him? So also no one comprehends the thoughts of God except the Spirit of God. Now we have received not the spirit of the world, but the Spirit who is from God, that we might understand the things freely given us by God”, whereas “The natural person does not accept the things of the Spirit of God, for they are folly to him, and he is not able to understand them because they are spiritually discerned.” (vv 11-12,14). Is Paul’s argument not as follows:

9. The gospel is one of the things of God.
10. No one understands the things of God except the Spirit of God.
11. Christians have received the Spirit of God.
12. Therefore, Christians can understand the gospel.
13. Conversely, the natural man has not received the Spirit of God.
14. Therefore, the natural man cannot understand the gospel, and thinks it is folly.

Believing in Christ, having faith, appropriating God’s promise and receiving the gift of salvation—these are only possible once we already have the Spirit of God in us because they entail knowing and understanding the things of God. Paul’s argument is precisely that our faith is after and because of the Spirit already indwelling us. By necessary consequence, then, the Spirit cannot indwell us after and because of our faith. Put in more succinct theological terms, 1 Corinthians 2 teaches plainly that regeneration, of necessity, precedes faith. I imagine you’ll agree that we can’t regenerate ourselves; we could not take the Spirit even if we wanted to; which as sinners we don’t. Thus, God is necessarily the one who is active in first bringing about faith; it could not happen if it were up to us. And, therefore, God must of necessity be the one who chooses the elect, solely based on his own will; not anything within them. And is this not what Jesus tells Nicodemus when he says, “unless one is born again he cannot see the kingdom of God”? Not that one can’t get into the kingdom of God without being born again—but that one can’t even see it.

b. How is it possible to reconcile God’s passive response to our own choosing with the definition of the word “elect”? As a verb, it means “to select by vote for an office, position, or membership” (Merriam-Webster). What does it mean for God to “elect” us if, in fact, we are the ones doing the “voting”? Why would the Bible refer to God’s act of election if, in fact, the vote was not his?

c. Based on what actual reality is God foreseeing who will accept prevenient grace, and who will not? Knowledge must have an ontological referent. But if God does not actually (ie, in reality) offer prevenient grace to all people, how does he know who will and will not receive it? There are probably various answers to this question; but the only unproblematic ones I can see would remove libertarian free will from the equation. For example, if God knows who will receive prevenient grace because he knows of some inherent difference between those who do, and those who don’t, then that inherent difference was itself placed there by God, since he created all people. But if that is so, then libertarian free will is obviated, since those who choose to reject grace do so because of something within them over which they have no control.

You might say God “just knows” because he is God; but then you have the problem of having no ontological referent—which I think is significant. But even if you can overcome that, there still seems to be the issue of God’s foreknowledge declaring an inevitable outcome, which appears to violate libertarian freedom anyway, since by definition such libertarianism precludes inevitability.

III. God’s sovereignty and relationship to sin

Does the idea that God is the agent which causes EVERYTHING to happen common in most Calvinist thought? It wasn’t in Erickson’s. Does this imply that God causes sin to happen too?

I take a very high view of God’s sovereignty, based on the (I think very severe) philosophical problems which result from a lower one. This view is not shared by all Calvinists, and certainly there is a spectrum of thought in Reformed theology over the precise nature of God’s causative agency. My position is fairly mainstream except for the fact that I’m not reduced to a shriveled shell of my former reasoning self when someone says, “Your view makes God the author of sin!” Provided that by “author” he means “ultimate cause” or something similar, I feel compelled by Scripture and sound reason to agree. I think Christians are phobic about this very, very ambiguous phrase, and go to great lengths to deny some patently biblical truths so as to “get God off the hook” for something that he himself claims responsibility for in his word.

My view is that God does not cause all things in the sense that we tend to think of cause and effect. That is, he is not the immediate or physical cause of things in the way that I am the immediate or physical cause of a door moving when I push it, or the keys on my keyboard depressing when I hit them. But he is the cause of those causes—the cause behind the causes. If he really does uphold the universe by the word of his power (Hebrews 1:3), and if he really is before all things, and if in him all things really do hold together (Colossians 1:17), then he must be the remote cause of all things inasmuch as nothing can happen without him actively bringing it about. Since all of creation is directly contingent upon him, every action or event or change in creation must also be contingent upon him, and so nothing could occur without his actively willing it and causing it. In my view, denying this collapses immediately into a kind of deism, which is both philosophically and biblically problematic.

Does this mean that God causes sin to happen? Is God the “author” of sin? What does Scripture say?

• “Then the LORD said to Moses, “Go in to Pharaoh, for I have hardened his heart and the heart of his servants, that I may show these signs of mine among them.” (Exodus 10:1)
• “But Sihon the king of Heshbon would not let us pass by him, for the LORD your God hardened his spirit and made his heart obstinate, that he might give him into your hand, as he is this day.” (Deuteronomy 2:30)
• “For it was the LORD’s doing to harden their hearts that they should come against Israel in battle, in order that they should be devoted to destruction and should receive no mercy but be destroyed, just as the LORD commanded Moses.” (Joshua 11:20)
• “And God sent an evil spirit between Abimelech and the leaders of Shechem, and the leaders of Shechem dealt treacherously with Abimelech.” (Judges 9:23)
• “Thus says the LORD, ‘Behold, I will raise up evil against you out of your own house. And I will take your wives before your eyes and give them to your neighbor, and he shall lie with your wives in the sight of this sun. For you did it secretly, but I will do this thing before all Israel and before the sun.’” (2 Samuel 12:11-12)
• “Again the anger of the LORD was kindled against Israel, and he incited David against them, saying, ‘Go, number Israel and Judah.’” (2 Samuel 24:1)
• “And the LORD said to him, ‘By what means?’ And he said, ‘I will go out, and will be a lying spirit in the mouth of all his prophets.’ And he said, ‘You are to entice him, and you shall succeed; go out and do so.’” (1 Kings 22:22)
• “With him are strength and sound wisdom; the deceived and the deceiver are his.” (Job 12:16)
• “The plans of the heart belong to man, but the answer of the tongue is from the LORD.” (Proverbs 16:1) “But no human being can tame the tongue. It is a restless evil, full of deadly poison.” (James 3:8)
• “The king’s heart is a stream of water in the hand of the LORD; he turns it wherever he will.” (Proverbs 21:1)
• “I form light and create darkness, I make well-being and create evil, I am the LORD, who does all these things.” (Isaiah 45:7)
• “O LORD, why do you make us wander from your ways and harden our heart, so that we fear you not? Return for the sake of your servants, the tribes of your heritage.” (Isaiah 63:17)
• “I know, O LORD, that the way of man is not in himself, that it is not in man who walks to direct his steps.” (Jeremiah 10:23)
• “And if the prophet is deceived and speaks a word, I, the LORD, have deceived that prophet, and I will stretch out my hand against him and will destroy him from the midst of my people Israel.” (Ezekiel 14:9)
• “Who has spoken and it came to pass, unless the Lord has commanded it? Is it not from the mouth of the Most High that good and bad come?” (Lamentations 3:37-38)
• “Is a trumpet blown in a city, and the people are not afraid? Does disaster come to a city, unless the LORD has done it?” (Amos 3:6)
• “He has blinded their eyes and hardened their heart, lest they see with their eyes, and understand with their heart, and turn, and I would heal them.” (John 12:40)
• “This Jesus, delivered up according to the definite plan and foreknowledge of God, you crucified and killed by the hands of lawless men.” (Acts 2:23)
• “But what God foretold by the mouth of all the prophets, that his Christ would suffer, he thus fulfilled.” (Acts 3:18)
• “For truly in this city there were gathered together against your holy servant Jesus, whom you anointed, both Herod and Pontius Pilate, along with the Gentiles and the peoples of Israel, to do whatever your hand and your plan had predestined to take place.” (Acts 4:27-28)
• “So then he has mercy on whomever he wills, and he hardens whomever he wills.” (Romans 9:18)
• “In him we have obtained an inheritance, having been predestined according to the purpose of him who works all things according to the counsel of his will” (Ephesians 1:11)
• “For it is God who works in you, both to will and to work for his good pleasure.” (Philippians 2:13)
• “Therefore God sends them a strong delusion, so that they may believe what is false” (2 Thessalonians 2:11)
• For God has put it into their hearts to carry out his purpose by being of one mind and handing over their royal power to the beast, until the words of God are fulfilled.” (Revelation 17:17)

As you can see, God is indeed sovereign over sin, and brings about whatsoever comes to pass. If this makes him the author of sin, then it is God himself who has taken that title upon himself by declaring as much in Scripture. I personally think that “author” is a valid way of describing God’s relationship to sin, since just as a human author may have his characters commit evil without himself being evil, so God, the author of all creation, may have his creatures commit evil without himself being evil. However, if by “author” one intends to mean “enactor”, as if God himself sins, then obviously that must be denied as blasphemy and nonsense.

Hopefully I’ve addressed all your major questions here. I imagine in doing so I will have raised a number more, and I’m very happy to continue this dialog.

Regards,
Bnonn

As always, it is very important to recognize the distinction between God and his creation, so that we are always cognizant of the distinction between the causes of an event. When discussing God’s total sovereignty (and it is sad that the qualifier total is required here), I have found that people routinely will conflate primary and secondary causes, so that God’s causing something from eternity becomes their sole focus, and the secondary causes and actions in creation are effectively forgotten and become a mere puppet game, or less, in their eyes.

The inevitable result of this is that they will object to God’s sovereignty on the grounds that it trivializes human actions in some way. Whether this objection arises out of a discussion of aseity, or of irresistible grace (which is simply the necessary consequence of aseity anyway), or of active reprobation (to which the same applies), it inevitably follows the same basic format: since God “does everything”, there is no reason for us to do anything at all.

This objection seems usually to be couched in terms of salvation—particularly with regards to evangelism, or to sanctification. That is, it is directed toward these two doctrines with the aim of demonstrating an incongruity or absurdity between them and sovereignty—with the aim of showing that the implications of God’s sovereignty make other biblical teachings which we accept irrational or meaningless. Here are two examples I have recently received; the first regarding evangelism, and the second sanctification:

If we hold to reformed theology we say, “God will raise someone up, if I don’t pray and I don’t go someone else will because it is God’s will that certain people will be saved”.

A belief in the assurance of salvation because “I am predestined for heaven” can be very dangerous. It can lead to spiritual complacency and a failure to grow in holiness: “Be perfect as your heavenly Father is perfect.” It can be a tool of the devil to lull people into a false sense of security.

It ought to be clear that neither of these statements accurately reflect the biblical position. Obviously they are incongruent with the scriptural commands to go out and make disciples of all nations (Matt 28:19), and to work out our own salvation in fear and trembling (Phil 2:12). But it is this incongruence which the objector wishes to show—and by means of which he can declare my presentation of God’s sovereignty unbiblical. There are several things to observe here, in dealing with this attack.

Firstly, the attack does not engage with my actual argument at all. Even if the objection is correct, and there is an incongruity between my presentation and the doctrines of evangelism and sanctification, this incongruity nonetheless does nothing to show that my presentation is false. It could be that the incongruity is established by Scripture itself. An incongruity need not be a contradiction. And, even if there is a contradiction, it has not been demonstrated that it is my presentation which is in error. Perhaps the doctrines of evangelism and sanctification have been misunderstood. If one wishes to refute my presentation, one should refute my presentation. A reductio ad adsurdum is a valid way of doing this, but only if it leads to a logical absurdity, such as a contradiction with established true premises. This has not been demonstrated.

Secondly, though, and more concerningly, the objection assumes that if there is an incongruity between what is metaphysically required in order to achieve a certain end, and what Scripture commands as regards our own actions toward that end, then we should not obey Scripture. This faithless disobedience is, of course, obfuscated—probably even to the objector. He does not mean to be so stupid, but rather, he thinks that Scripture would not require us to do something which is not actually necessary to the end result. But why does he think this? If he thinks it would not do this, then presumably it is because he thinks that to command something unnecessary would be wrong, and Scripture is never wrong. In other words, his assumption is that Scripture should not command us to do something which isn’t necessary to the end in question—and therefore it would not command it. But from where did he get this assumption that it is wrong for God to command us to do something he doesn’t need us to do? If his assumption isn’t scriptural, then it’s rubbish; but he certainly hasn’t shown it from Scripture. No, on the contrary, he has smuggled this entire premise into his argument under the radar. But this idea that God would only command that which is necessary to some end is to presuppose that our actions are necessary to that end—which is the very conclusion which the objection seeks to prove! The objector is saying, in effect, that since our actions are necessary to achieve the end, God has commanded these actions so that the end will be achieved; therefore, God has not commanded the actions for some other reason. But if God has commanded the actions for some other reason, then he might not have commanded them because they are necessary. And the objector has by no means shown that this is not the case. There is no reason to suppose that God would not command us to do something simply because he wants us to do it. And, regardless of whether it is necessary or not, we are commanded to evangelize and work out our salvation, and so we must therefore do it.

The concealed root of this objection is the underlying assumption that, if our actions are not necessary to achieve the result in question, then there is no point in doing them. But this is a remarkably sinister assumption indeed, and I can only view with the deepest suspicion the alleged faith of anyone who would demand such pragmatic justification from God for the commands he gives us. We do not consider God’s commands worth following because of some pragmatic result which they bring about. We consider them valuable because they are God’s commands! I cannot imagine a more perverse mind than one which considers God’s commands worthless if they do not describe a course of action in which we ourselves have some personal power to bring about a change. For a Christian to hold such a warped sense of priorities suggests a most profound spiritual immaturity and attachment to humanistic philosophy. It is by no means an excuse for him to affirm this foolishness without full cognizance of it. Certainly I don’t imagine that the majority of professing believers who make such objections realize the sinister assumptions implicit to their reasoning—but this only reveals how very intrinsic it is to their thinking, and thus, if anything, condemns them more.

Thirdly, and most pertinently, this objection conflates what is necessary in a primary or ultimate sense with what is necessary in a secondary sense. I by no means affirm that it is not necessary, in the secondary sense, for us to evangelize in order for people to be brought to faith. God has decreed that the way by which he will save his elect is through the evangelistic actions of other members of that elect. So, most importantly, the idea that we need not pray or evangelize because God has already decreed certain people to be saved is a self-contradictory statement. Since those whom God has decreed to be saved he has also decreed will be saved through the means of prayer and evangelism, it is honestly difficult for me to fathom how anyone could suppose that predestination must mitigate the need for these things. It takes a certain kind of obtuseness to think that God’s primary causation of all things somehow obviates those things altogether. What I mean is, if God has determined that all his elect shall work out their sanctification to some degree during their lives (to take our other example), has commanded his elect to work out their sanctification, and then proceeds to cause his elect to do this, it is simply bewildering to then encounter the suggestion that, since we are elect, we do not need work out our sanctification! It is akin to saying that, since God has determined that I will come to know his word, I don’t need to read my Bible.

Such a view completely ignores that, in addition to God determining certain ends, he has also determined certain means. He could have determined some other ends, or some other means; but he did not—he determined these ones. If I don’t read my Bible, then it is most certain that he did not determine that I would come to knowledge of his word. But if he has determined that I will come to such knowledge, then he most certainly has also decreed that I will read my Bible. Many people seem to become confused at this point, by merit of the fact that I am involved in this process. But why? It is not as if God’s primary action obviates the need for my own secondary action. If God has determined that I will read my Bible, then I will read my Bible—but I will not do it like a puppet or automaton, apart from my own will. Similarly, if God has decreed that some person I know will be saved, and he has decreed that it will happen through my evangelism, then my own actions are the means he has determined and will cause. But his determination and cause are primary; my own actions are the secondary means he uses to bring about the result, and part of those secondary means is my own conscious and willing effort. Certainly God is causing me to write this article—but this is happening in the primary sense. It does not obviate or conflict with my own writing of the article in the secondary sense; and to assume otherwise is simply to commit a category error by conflating the two contexts of discussion.

Therefore, there is no incongruity at all between God’s sovereignty, and his commands to evangelize to others and sanctify ourselves. Mounting an argument on the basis of such a supposed incongruity is not only to commit a category error by equivocating between primary and secondary causes, but also to beg the question and presuppose an ungodly moral pragmatism by which to judge scriptural commands. These are all irrational fallacies we should expect from unbelievers—but they are more difficult to tolerate from professing Christians. Nonetheless, if I seem harsh it is only to emphasize the seriousness of the error, and the sin which underlies it. I would expect the same treatment of my own errors. Let a righteous man strike me—it is a kindness; let him rebuke me—it is oil for my head; let my head not refuse it (Ps 141:5).

Related posts:

1. Determinism and the authorship of sin in Calvinism and Arminianism