Dominic Bnonn Tennant

A critical look at a New York Times article that discusses the tension between the idea that all the events in the universe are caused deterministically by physical laws, and our deep-seated intuitive belief that this cannot be so because we have free will.

This is a continuation of the discussion started with Stuart McEwing in his article ‘Openness Theology (Part Two)’, exploring the ramifications of libertarian free will, the principle of alternative possibilities; and how an Arminian theology ultimately collapses into either a Reformed or Open theology, depending on how you push it.

A polemic against the argument that, in light of the apparently contradicting evidence of our moral intuitions, total depravity should be interpreted metaphorically.

Arminians object to determinism because it makes God the “author of evil”—but does their own system avoid it? In this post, I argue that although they disagree with Calvinists about the nature of God’s sovereignty, their own theology commits them to an equally deterministic view.

In this series, I consider the competing doctrines of libertarian and compatibilist free will, arguing that the former is unbiblical and incoherent, and that the latter is necessary for upholding God’s sovereignty and man’s responsibility.

This is part 2 of 6, in which I compare determinism and indeterminism to clarify their differences.

In this series, I consider the competing doctrines of libertarian and compatibilist free will, arguing that the former is unbiblical and incoherent, and that the latter is necessary for upholding God’s sovereignty and man’s responsibility.

This is part 1 of 6, in which I present a simple argument showing that the Bible’s teaching about God’s action upon creation logically entails that nothing occurs without his actually causing it.

In this series, I consider the competing doctrines of libertarian and compatibilist free will, arguing that the former is unbiblical and incoherent, and that the latter is necessary for upholding God’s sovereignty and man’s responsibility.

This is the introduction to the series, in which I define the distinctives of libertarianism and compatibilism, and summarize the issues I’ll discuss.