A critical look at a New York Times article that discusses the tension between the idea that all the events in the universe are caused deterministically by physical laws, and our deep-seated intuitive belief that this cannot be so because we have free will.
A discussion of how Occam’s Razor is sometimes used as a basis for objecting to Christianity, highlighting some serious philosophical problems with this approach.
A continuation of my previous commentary on the question of whether intelligent design is a scientific inference. Here, I respond to some objections by kiwi atheist Ken Perrott, pointing out the hypocrisy of secular scientists in labeling the anti-ID thesis as scientific, while denying the same standing for ID itself.
The question of whether intelligent design is a scientific or philosophical inference is a contentious and oft-debated one. Using a recent discussion on Ken Perrott’s blog as a kick-off point, I offer a brief commentary on this issue, giving reasons for why it is arbitrary to dismiss ID as unscientific.
Continued from part 3 « It is time to affirm the truth of God’s word. Your opponent’s intellectual stronghold has crumbled to dust. His foundational assumptions have been exposed as subjective opinions; his reasoning as irrational; his arguments as speculation; his worldview as fantasy. He has been disarmed, and evicted from his castle of sand; [...]
Continued from part 2 « Of course, having established that empiricism is incapable of producing the knowledge which science claims to have, there is technically no need to continue the critique any further. But most pro-science non-Christians (and even some pro-science Christians) will be unpersuaded by the failures of empiricism, and will continue to pretend [...]
Continued from part 1 « Scientific knowledge-acquisition is empirical. That is, its method takes the form of observing physical events so as to draw conclusions about them. Now, it seems to us intuitively obvious that we have knowledge of physical events; and we certainly talk about them as if they actually occur as we suppose. [...]